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Abstract
This paper considers a ﬁrm that has to delegate to an agent, such as a mortgage
broker or a security dealer, the twin tasks of approaching and advising customers.
The main contractual restriction, in particular in light of related research in Inderst
and Ottaviani (2007), is that the ﬁrm can only compensate the agent through com-
missions. This standard contracting restriction has the following key implications.
First, the ﬁrm can only ensure internal compliance to a "standard of sales", in terms
of advice for the customer, if this standard is not too high. Second, if this is still
feasible, then a higher standard is associated with higher, instead of lower, sales
commissions. Third, once the limit for internal compliance is approached, tougher
regulation and prosecution of "misselling" have (almost) no eﬀect on the prevailing
standard. Besides having practical implications, in particular on how to (re-)regulate
the sale of ﬁnancial products, the novel model, which embeds a problem of advice
into a framework with repeated interactions, may also be of separate interest for
future work on sales force compensation.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D18 (Consumer Protection), D83 (Search; Learning; Infor-
mation and Knowledge), M31 (Marketing), M52 (Compensation and Compensation
Methods and Their Eﬀects).
∗University of Frankfurt and LSE. E-mail: inderst@ﬁnance.uni-frankfurt.de.1 Introduction
Inderst and Ottaviani (IO 2007) develop a model of "misselling" through agents. There, a
ﬁrm must hire an agent, such as a salesperson or a broker, both to approach customers and
to provide advice on how suitable the product is, given a customer’s speciﬁcn e e d s . 1 Even
when the ﬁrm wants to comply to a certain standard at the advice stage, thus advising
customers only if the product is "suﬃciently" suitable, this still has to be enforced vis-á-vis
the ﬁrm’s agents. The main application of this model is to ﬁnancial retail products, such
as investment funds, pensions, mortgages, or insurance products.2
Despite the internal agency problem, in IO (2007) the ﬁrm can, however, still ensure
compliance to any standard that it ﬁnds optimal to set. This is achieved by paying the
agent a suﬃciently high rent, which comes in the form of a basic (ﬂat) wage. In some
industries and, in particular, when independent agents such as brokers and dealers are
used, such ﬁxed payments are rare, while additional incentives for the agent may come
from the repeated interaction, i.e., the threat of severing the business relationship. On
a theoretical level, such a limit to contracting has long been recognized in the ﬁnancial
contracting literature, where it is argued that such "ﬁx e dp a y m e n t s "w o u l ds w a m pt h e
ﬁrm with the "wrong" applicants—i.e., in the language of the present model, applicants
who are unable to attract customers and are thus planning to have a "quiet life".3
A key result of this short paper is to point to the following policy implication of such
a contractual restriction: the inability of the ﬁrm, given its internal agency problem, to
implement a standard of sales above a certain threshold. Making the ﬁrm vicariously liable
for the agent’s advice and imposing ever higher penalties in case of alleged "unsuitable
selling" (or "misselling") may then be largely ineﬀective, though it could impose high costs
on regulators, the legal system, and the ﬁrm.
From a more theoretical perspective, the paper studies a model in the spirit of the
"eﬃciency wage" literature (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)), with the additional feature
1The agency perspective is a key diﬀerence to the large literature on credence and experience goods,
following Darby and Karni (1973).
2At the time of writing this paper, arguably the most salient case is that of subprime mortgages
in the US. According to some observes, customers may often have been ill-advised to take out "jumbo
mortgages", which lead to subsequent default and foreclosure, once repayment obligations switched from
low teaser rates to much higher rates.
3The ﬁn a n c i a lc o n t r a c t i n gl i t e r a t u r es o m e t i m e sr e f e r st ot h e s ea g e n t sa s" ﬂy-by-night operators" (cf.
Rajan (1992)).
1that the ﬁrm’s agent has two tasks to perform, but the ﬁrm has only one instrument at
its disposal: the sales commission. For the purpose of our analysis, we also abstract from
the possibility to write long-term contracts that are contingent on the history of past per-
formance.4 As is standard, this can be justiﬁed on the grounds that the resulting "bond"
that the agent would thereby post may not be feasible, given that it would induce oppor-
tunistic behavior by the ﬁrm. From a more applied perspective, the modelling framework
may also be of interest to the large literature on salesforce competition (e.g., Basu et al.
(1985)).5 With respect to the application to retail ﬁnancial products, this paper and IO
(2007) follow Bolton et al. (2007), which also considers the role of advice, albeit without
the internal agency problem that is at the core of the present analysis.
2 Limits to Compliance
A ﬁrm (the principal) can sell in each period t ∈ {1,...,∞} as i n g l ep r o d u c tt h r o u g ha n
agent. Both parties are risk neutral and discount future payoﬀsb ys o m ec o m m o nd i s c o u n t
factor 0 <δ<1. The agent is protected by limited liability and has a reservation value
of zero. In each period, by exerting only privately observed eﬀort at disutility c>0
the agent contacts a potential customer with probability μ>0.W h e t h e r a c u s t o m e r
was contacted or not is also the agent’s private information. The agent then advises the
customer on whether the good is suitable for him or not. For this purpose, the agent
privately observes the probability that the product is ultimately suitable for the respective
customer: q ∈ [0,1], which is distributed according to G(q) with density g(q) > 0.6 Denote
b q :=
R 1
0 qg(q)dq,w h i c hi st h eex-ante likelihood with which the product is suitable for any
given customer at time t.
For the purpose of the present analysis, we abstract from the communication game
between the agent and the customer, supposing that, ﬁrst, the customer always follows
the agent’s advice and that, second, there is an exogenous price p at which the product
is sold. The price p>0 exceeds the ﬁrm’s cost, which is normalized to zero. In IO
(2007), p is determined endogenously, based on customers’ rational beliefs about the agent’s
4Cf. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, chapter 10) for a detailed account of this large literature.
5The underlying multi-task agency problem follows Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and, more closely,
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
6See IO (2007) for how the (conditional) probability q can be backed out from some signal-generating
technology.
2communication strategy. Adding this feature to the present model would not alter results
in any way. Moreover, the speciﬁcc a s ew h e r ep is exogenous may ﬁt particular applications,
e.g., to health care, where the price may be either regulated or negotiated and paid for by
a third party (e.g., the insurer).
As discussed in the Introduction, in contrast to IO (2007) we only allow for positive
payments that are made if a sale was concluded, namely through paying some commission
or fee f ≥ 0. This can also not be made contingent on some post-sale signal that the ﬁrm
observes, given that this is not veriﬁable. We suppose that, say through some internal
review process that checks a fraction γ of sales, such a signal reveals the customer’s type
(i.e., the suitability of the purchase), but is only correct with probability ϕ>0.5.F o r
simplicity, set γ =1 .7 The ﬁrm can replace the agent at the end of each period at zero
cost. This makes it credible to hire or ﬁre the agent conditional on the outcome of the
check. After a bad signal on the suitability, b,t h ea g e n ti sﬁr e dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yη.8 We
let the ﬁrm choose (f,η) to maximize its proﬁts.
T h ea s s u m p t i o n st h a tw em a d es of a rr e g a r d i n gw h a ti so b s e r v a b l ea n dw h a tc a nb e
contracted on allows us to focus squarely on the dual role of the sales commission f,w h i c h
we explore next. Provided that some choice of (f,η) gives the agent suﬃcient incentives
to exert eﬀort in any given period, we ask ﬁrst about the agent’s optimal decision rule
when advising a customer. Given stationarity of the problem, we can denote the agent’s
expected utility at the beginning of each period by U. When observing some q, the agent
will only advise the customer to purchase if
f ≥ η[ϕ[1 − q]+( 1− ϕ)q]δU, (1)
which captures the trade-oﬀ between earning f and the increased risk of losing his con-
tinuation utility. Holding f and U ﬁxed, (1) generates a cutoﬀ q∗,s u c ht h a ti ti so n l y
satisﬁed for values q ≥ q∗. If this cutoﬀ is interior, we have that
q
∗ =
1
2ϕ − 1
∙
ϕ −
f
ηδU
¸
. (2)
Otherwise, the agent would either never or always want to advise the customer to purchase.
We capture the latter two cases by setting either q∗ =0(in case f ≥ ηϕδU)o rq∗ =1(in
7The following setting diﬀers somewhat from IO (2007). There, given the additional complexity of the
model, only a simpler monitoring technology was considered.
8Firing the agent with positive probability after no sale was made will not be in the ﬁrm’s interest.
Likewise, it will not be optimal to ﬁre the agent after a good signal on suitability, g, was revealed.
3case f ≤ η(1 − ϕ)δU).9 Note, however, that U is endogenous and will, as discussed next,
also depend on the chosen q∗.
In the present section, we are concerned with the ﬁrm’s internal agency problem alone,
i.e., the ﬁrm’s problem to induce eﬀort and to implement a given "standard of advice":
q∗. The question of what is optimal for the ﬁrm, taking into account its own proﬁts from
a sale, will be addressed subsequently.
Suppose that there is an interior cutoﬀ q∗ as in (2). From stationarity and using
u := μf [1 − G(q∗)]−c for the agent’s expected per-period utility, provided that the agent
exerts eﬀort and applies the standard q∗,w eh a v et h a t
U =
u
1 − δ + δμη
R 1
q∗ [ϕ[1 − q]+( 1− ϕ)q]g(q)dq
. (3)
(Cf. the proof of Lemma 1 for more details.) Intuitively, the expected utility of the agent
is strictly increasing in f. Hence, when considering condition (2), there are thus two
conﬂicting forces that aﬀect the prevailing standard q∗:Ah i g h e rf increases the agent’s
instant beneﬁts from a sale, but it also increases the value that he puts at risk, namely
δU. We explore this tension ﬁrst, namely in Lemmas 1 and 2, before fully characterizing
the equilibrium outcome. Both Lemmas 1 and 2 will thus, for the time being, build on the
presumption that for the considered set of values (f,η) there exists a unique equilibrium
standard q∗, satisfying (2).
Lemma 1 A marginal increase in the sales commission f leads to an increase, rather than
a decrease, in the lending standard if
Z 1
q∗
[q − q
∗]g(q)dq >
1
η
1
μ
1 − δ
δ
1
2ϕ − 1
. (4)
Instead, if the converse of (4) holds strictly, then the standard decreases.
Proof. To ﬁrst derive (3) more explicitly, we use r(q): =η[ϕ[1 − q]+( 1− ϕ)q],s u c h
that (2) can be expressed as r(q∗)=
f
δU. From stationarity, we have next
U = δU [(1 − μ)+μG(q
∗)] + μ
Z 1
q∗
[f +[ 1− r(q)]δU]g(q)dq − c,
9Technically speaking, (2) represents the solution to the agent’s Bellman equation. Note that the
realizations q =0and q =1are zero-probability events.
4which uses, in particular, that no purchase is made with probability (1 − μ)+μG(q∗).
Substituting u yields expression (3). Note next that, using optimality of q∗,w eh a v et h a t
dU
df
=
∂U
∂f
=
μ[1 − G(q∗)]
1 − δ + δμ
R 1
q∗ r(q)g(q)dq
. (5)
Implicit diﬀerentiation of r(q∗)δU − f =0from (2) yields next
dq∗
df
= −
1
δUr0(q∗)
∙
r(q
∗)δ
∂U
∂f
− 1
¸
, (6)
which from r0(q∗) < 0 is thus positive if and only if r(q∗)δ∂U
∂f > 1. After substitution from
(5), this yields (4). Q.E.D.
From Lemma 1, the eﬀect that a change in f has on the equilibrium standard q∗
depends thus on condition (4). There are two key observations to be made. First, an
increase in f can push up the standard, even though the agent’s contemporaneous beneﬁts
from selling increase. Second, this works, however, only at low values of q∗ that still satisfy
condition (4). In fact, values of q∗ where condition (4) does not hold are thus not feasible.
Lemma 2 Suppose
1
η
1
μ
1 − δ
δ
1
2ϕ − 1
< b q (7)
holds. Then there exists 0 < q<1 satisfying
Z 1
q
[q − q]g(q)dq =
1
η
1
μ
1 − δ
δ
1
2ϕ − 1
, (8)
such that it is only feasible to implement a standard q∗ that satisﬁes q∗ ≤ q. The boundary
q is higher in case:
i) the one-shot agency problem is less severe, as μ and ϕ are higher;
ii) the agent is more patient, as δ is higher;
iii) or the agent is ﬁred with a higher probability η after a bad signal.
In case (7) does not hold, then no positive standard q∗ > 0 can be achieved.
Proof. Observe ﬁrst that
R 1
q∗ [q − q∗]g(q)dq = b q holds for q∗ =0 . The upper boundary
q follows immediately from rewriting condition (4). The comparative analysis in i)-iii)
follows, in turn, after noting that the left-hand side of (8) is strictly decreasing in q.
Q.E.D.
5To complete the analysis in this Section we have to fully characterize the equilibrium
for given choices (f,η). For this we have also to take into account that if f is too low,
then the agent will not work. In fact, eﬀort is only privately optimal for the agent in case
u ≥ 0,w h e r eu depends, however, also on q∗.
Proposition 1 For given (f,η), we have the following equilibrium characterization: i) If
c>μ f,t h e nn oe ﬀort will be exerted; ii) If c = μf,t h e nt h e r ee x i s tm u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i ai n
which either no eﬀort is exerted or eﬀort is exerted and the standard q∗ =0is chosen; iii)
if c<μ f,t h e ne ﬀort is exerted and the following cases apply:
- In case condition (7) holds together with
f ≥ c
δηϕ
δμ(2ϕ − 1)ηb q − (1 − δ)
, (9)
then there exists a unique equilibrium that leads to an interior cutoﬀ 0 <q≤ q.
- If either (7) or (9) do not hold, then q∗ =0 .
Proof. We ask ﬁrst when there exists an equilibrium with 0 <q ∗ ≤ q. From our pre-
vious observations, for given (f,η) a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an equilibrium,
as characterized by some values for q∗ and U, is that the following conditions hold jointly.
First, to ensure that eﬀo r ti se x e r c i s e d ,i tm u s th o l dt h a tu ≥ 0.S e c o n d ,q∗ and U must
jointly satisfy (2) and (3), which holds if
ψ(q
∗): =δμf
∙Z 1
q∗
[r(q
∗) − r(q)]g(q)dq
¸
− f(1 − δ) − cδr(q
∗)=0 . (10)
Note next that ψ
0(q∗) < 0 holds if and only if c<μ f[1 − G(q∗)], i.e., if and only if u>0.
Together with ψ(1) < 0,w et h u sh a v et h a tf o rc>μ fthere is no value q∗ satisfying
ψ(q∗)=0 ,w h i l ef o rc<μ fany such value must be unique. In the latter case, such a
v a l u ea l s oe x i s t si fψ(0) > 0 a n dt h u sa f t e r ,s o m et r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ,i f
f [δμ(2ϕ − 1)ηb q − (1 − δ)] >c δ η ϕ . (11)
Condition (11) holds in turn only if two conditions are jointly satisﬁed: conditions (7) and
(9). To conclude the proof, the cases where q∗ =0can be an equilibrium are immediate
from the previous arguments. Q.E.D.
63 Optimal Standard
When making a sale, the ﬁrm realizes the proﬁt p − f, which is net of the agent’s fee. If
the ﬁrm does not care about the customer’s utility, i.e., whether the product is suitable
or not, then the ﬁrm’s optimal compensation contract is immediate: It chooses f = c/μ,
thereby inducing q∗ =0 , whenever p>c / μ , while for p<c / μit is clearly unproﬁtable
to operate. As in IO (2007), we suppose now that a customer who bought an unsuitable
product imposes on the ﬁrm a cost ρ>0 (e.g., through loss of reputation or the actions
of a regulator or courts). We further suppose that it is indeed optimal for the ﬁrm to
operate. The ﬁrm’s discounted proﬁts are, for given (f,η) and with corresponding q∗,
obtained from10
π =
1
1 − δ
μ
Z 1
q∗
[p − f − (1 − q)ρ]g(q)dq. (12)
Note that when the ﬁrm implements q∗ =0and thus chooses f = c/μ, the agent does not
realize any rent. At any higher q∗, the agent realizes a strictly positive rent U>0.F r o m
Proposition 1, a strictly positive standard can only be obtained if condition (7), which is
only on the primitives and on η, holds. Moreover, in this case f must exceed (9). From
Lemma 1, any further increase results in a strictly higher q∗,a l b e i tn o tb e y o n dq.I nf a c t ,
the marginal impact that f has on q∗ goes to zero as q∗ → q. While the ﬁrm can thus
be induced to set a higher standard, namely through a higher "penalty" ρ, this becomes
largely ineﬀective as the penalty increases and q∗ approaches q.
Proposition 2 Suppose that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to implement a strictly positive
standard q∗ > 0.T h e nt h eﬁrm chooses η =1 ,w h i l eq∗ < q satisﬁes
−[p − f − (1 − q
∗)ρ]g(q
∗)=[ 1− G(q
∗)]
df
dq∗, (13)
where df /dq ∗ > 0.A ni n c r e a s ei nq∗, as obtained from a higher "penalty" ρ,w o u l dt h u s
be associated with a higher sales commission f.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that η =1is indeed uniquely optimal. This follows as a given
q∗ > 0 can be implemented by a strictly smaller fee f in case η is chosen higher. Formally,
we have from implicit diﬀerentiation of ψ(q∗)=0in (10), which can be rewritten as
f
∙
δμη(2ϕ − 1)
Z 1
q∗
[q − q
∗]g(q)dq − (1 − δ)
¸
− cδr(q
∗)=0 ,
10Recall that replacing the present agent comes at zero cost.
7that df /dη < 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h a tdq∗/dρ > 0 is obtained immediately from (13), after
implicit diﬀerentiation and appealing to strict quasiconcavity of the objective function.
Finally, note that the observation in the main text for q∗ → q follows immediately as in
this case df /dq ∗ → 0 (cf. (6)). Q.E.D.
If the agent can be compensated only by f, instead of also some ﬁxed wage as in
IO (2007), then in equilibrium the relation between the size of the commission and the
implemented standard is at ﬁrst counterintuitive: A higher standard is associated with a
higher sales commission. For policymakers, Proposition 2 thus spells out a warning against
associating high fees with low standards. Moreover, Proposition 2 also reiterates a second
key insight from this short paper: that the ﬁrm’s internal agency problem may impose
a limit on the standard that the ﬁr mc a ni m p l e m e n t ,e v e nw h e np o l i c y m a k e r sc h o o s ea n
ever higher penalty ρ.T h eﬁrm’s ultimate response may then be rather to drop out of the
market.
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